I investigate novel solutions to metaphysical puzzles, the logic underlying those solutions, and metaphysical consequences of those solutions. These metaphysical puzzles are often cases which force a choice between intuitive, but incompatible claims. By novel solutions, I mean those that attempt to reconcile the incompatible claims, not by rejecting one, but rather by rejecting a background assumption in the case that is rarely questioned. I am particularly interested in solutions which require revising a common assumption about an important metaphysical concept or relation (like existence, identity, or composition) and revisions that articulated using non-standard logics.
I am also the current editor for the subcateogry
Vague Identity on PhilPapers.org.
Cody Gilmore has argued that the parthood relation concrete objects stand in and the parthood relation constituents of propositions stand in to propositions is 1) the same, and 2) is a 4-place relation. I argue that the ontological differences in concrete and abstract locations means these relations are not the same parthood relation.